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Welcome to the Dark Side
LIBERALS REDISCOVER FEDERALISM IN THE
WAKE OF THE WAR ON TERROR
Ernest A. Young'
I. INTRODUCTION
For several decades now, American liberals have not
had much good to say about federalism. The reason is not far to
seek: At many key points in our history, the banner of "states'
rights" has been raised in order to defend fundamentally
repugnant substantive policies - most obviously, slavery in the
nineteenth century and Jim Crow segregation in the twentieth.
Many have assumed that the story of state-based racial
oppression reveals a fundamental truth about the dynamics of
federalism, that is, that the States will always be less
"progressive" than the national government. We have tended to
forget other points in our history that reveal a different
pattern, such as Virginia's and Kentucky's protest against the
Alien and Sedition Acts, or the abolitionist northern states'
resistance to the federal Fugitive Slave Law.
The worm may be turning, however, in the wake of the
conservative Bush Administration's War on Terror. As Ann
Althouse's thoughtful paper for this symposium discusses,
© 2004 Ernest A. Young. All Rights Reserved.
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several states and dozens of local governments have taken
stands against perceived excesses in the federal USA PATRIOT
Act,' either simply by expressing their disapproval or, in some
cases, by ordering their officers not to cooperate in the
administration of the national law.2  Vikram Amar's
contribution urges, in response to similar concerns about
federal overreaching, that state legislatures and/or courts
should create state-law causes of action against federal officials
for violations of federal constitutional rights.3 More generally,
on a range of issues, liberals may be starting to wake up to the
fact that they no longer control the national government. On
issues ranging from gay marriage to physician-assisted suicide
to environmental protection, individual states have staked out
"progressive" positions that have then come under attack from
the Republican administration in Washington, D.C. As
Democratic hopes for quickly regaining control at the center
fade,' at least some liberals have taken up the cause of state
autonomy.
1 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001). One cannot help but wonder how long it took some
enterprising staffer to come up with that acronym. For a survey of the Act's provisions,
see Michael T. McCarthy, Recent Developments - USA Patriot Act, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 435 (2002).
2 See Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of
Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1231 (2004).
3 See Vikram David Amar, Converse 1983 Suits in Which States Police
Federal Agents: An Idea Whose Time Has Arrived, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1369 (2004).
4 This realization may be at the root of Erwin Chemerinsky's entry here,
which mounts a general critique of the Rehnquist Court's preemption jurisprudence for
broadly construing federal law to squelch progressive impulses at the state level on a
number of issues. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A
Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004).
5 As I wrote a draft of this essay in January 2004, President Bush enjoyed a
10 to 20 point lead in the polls over his potential democratic challengers. See Robert J.
Caldwell, Bush Enters Campaign Season with Positive Momentum, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Jan. 18, 2004, at G6 (reporting CNN/USA Today/Gallup and NBC News/Wall
Street Journal polls taken in mid-January). As I near a final draft in April 2004, the
President's lead over presumptive Democratic nominee John Kerry has narrowed to a
single point. See Little Change in Presidential Poll, USAToday.com (Apr. 9, 2004),
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/president/2004-04-
09-ap-poll-x.htm. All this may change radically again by the November election. But
structural factors such as redistricting will make it exceptionally difficult for
Democrats to retake control of Congress, virtually guaranteeing that the pattern of
stable, long-term Democratic control of the national legislature, which existed virtually
throughout the period of substantial expansion of federal legislative power after 1937,
will not recur any time soon.
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This essay seeks to place the role of state and local
governments in the War on Terror6 in the context of broader
debates about federalism. Part I follows Professor Althouse's
lead in focusing on the question of the national government's
ability to require state and local cooperation with federal anti-
terrorism initiatives. This issue is evocative for several
reasons: It illustrates the several different ways in which
federalism promotes and protects individual freedom,
resonating with a long, if mostly forgotten, history of state
governmental resistance to national measures thought to
encroach on civil liberties. The strong concern of nationalists
about state and local non-cooperation on anti-terrorism
measures, moreover, gives the lie to nationalist assurances
that "political safeguards" will always be sufficient to protect
the federal balance. Finally, state and local resistance to
national anti-terrorism measures demonstrates the expressive
function of state and local governments as a voice for the
People, thereby raising complex questions about First
Amendment limits on the federal government's ability to stifle
state-centered dissent.
Part II steps back to assess more general questions
raised by recent liberal support for state autonomy. I argue
that liberals are right to embrace federalism, because state
autonomy has no intrinsic correlation to politically
conservative outcomes; moreover, in an era when conservatives
may control at least important parts of the national
government for some time, some states will offer liberals their
best source of institutional support. I also address the question
of opportunism, concluding that the Framers designed our
system of horizontal and vertical separation of powers around
the expectation that individuals and groups would support one
institution or the other at any given time for politically
opportunistic reasons. I suggest, however, that the liberal
embrace of federalism now is more likely to be credible to the
unpersuaded if it is coupled with a more principled and long-
term acceptance of state autonomy.
6 "War on Terror" is itself a contested term. See, e.g., PHILIP B. HEYMANN,
TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 19-33 (2003) (arguing
that thinking about the struggle against terrorism in terms of "war" is
counterproductive). I have no dog in that fight, and I use the term only as a common
shorthand for a broad governmental effort to make American society more secure from
terrorist attacks.
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Two caveats are in order. The first is that I am
personally skeptical of - and at best agnostic about - claims
that the War on Terror in general or the USA PATRIOT Act in
particular actually represent a major threat to civil liberties.7
There is no doubt, however, that many on both the political
Left and Right perceive such a threat, and I do not believe their
concerns to be trivial. The War on Terror thus provides a good
laboratory for assessing the ability of state and local
governments to resist perceived threats to civil liberties.
Second, I have long insisted that the political labels of
"liberal" and "conservative" are subject to a variety of
interpretations. In this essay, I use those terms in their general
political senses, as opposed to situational or institutional
meanings of those terms.' One can make a "conservative" case
for gay rights or environmental protection, for example, but
that would be counter-intuitive to the sense in which I will
generally use the term here. Likewise, one can argue that
federalism is a creature of Enlightenment Liberalism's
rationalistic institutional design, or that it facilitates
incremental social change congenial to Burkean conservatives.
What I want to insist upon here, however, is that federalism
has no dependable liberal or conservative valence as those
terms are understood today in an intuitively political sense. As
the War on Terror vividly illustrates, political liberals ought to
be open to the possibility that state autonomy may become
their new best friend.
II. COMMANDEERING, LIBERTY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR
Criminal law enforcement has traditionally been a state
and (primarily) local responsibility in this country. The
distribution of law enforcement manpower reflects this history:
A 2000 census of state and local law enforcement agencies
counted over one million full-time law enforcement personnel,9
7 For arguments that the War on Terror does threaten civil liberties, see, for
example, HEYMANN, supra note 6; David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating
History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003).
8 See generally Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative
Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1182-1203 (2002) (distinguishing between
situational, political, and institutional forms of conservatism).
9 BRIAN A. REAVES & MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES, 2000, at 1 (Oct. 2002), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/csllea00.pdf. Over 75 percent of these employees
were local police. See id. at 2.
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while a 2002 survey of federal law enforcement found
approximately 93,000 full-time personnel." As William Stuntz
recently observed, "[t]he federal government has never
employed a sizable fraction of the nation's law enforcement
officers or prosecutors, nor housed a large portion of its
prisoners."" September 11 may have changed the general
perception that states and localities should take the lead in
assuring domestic safety; we have, after all, just created a
massive new federal Department of Homeland Security. The
practical reality of enforcement resources seems likely to
change more slowly, however. At least in the short term, the
FBI and other federal law enforcement institutions are
unlikely to cover the many responsibilities that "homeland
security" entails without substantial state and local assistance.
This federal need for assistance quite properly
motivates Professor Althouse's focus on the anti-
commandeering doctrine. That doctrine holds that "[t]he
Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the
States to address particular problems, nor command the States'
officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program."'2  The Federal
Government cannot, in other words, simply compel state and
local cooperation in anti-terrorism enforcement. This rule
eschews "case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits" on
the ground that "such commands are fundamentally
incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty." 3 Absent a substantial modification of current
doctrine, then, the anti-commandeering principle is unlikely to
yield to strong national interests in anti-terrorism
enforcement. The federal government's ability to secure state
10 BRIAN A. REAVES & LYNN M. BAUER, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2002, at 1
(Aug. 2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fleo02.pdf. The later
federal figure reflects a six percent increase over 2000 levels, concentrated largely in
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Customs Service, and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. See id. Although the survey was conducted
prior to enactment of the Department of Homeland Security Legislation, it seems likely
that the increase in personnel reflects, at least to some extent, federal reaction to the
September 11 attacks.
" William J. Stuntz, Terrorism, Federalism, and Police Misconduct, 25 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POLY 665, 665 (2002); see also Ronald K. Chen, State Incarceration of
Federal Prisoners After September 11: Whose Jail is it Anyway?, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
1335 (2004) (chronicling the national government's use of state facilities in New Jersey
to detain aliens suspected of ties to terrorism).
12 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
13 Id.
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and local assistance will thus depend on its ability to secure
willing - or at least grudging - compliance.
In the overwhelming majority of cases, of course, we can
expect such cooperation to be forthcoming. A vocal minority of
state and local governments, however, have announced their
opposition to many of the federal policies that comprise the
War on Terror. The most common form of state or local action
consists of resolutions that reaffirm support for civil liberties
and diversity, express particular concerns about the PATRIOT
Act and other national anti-terror policies, and urge state or
local officials to uphold the rights of their citizens. 4 Some
jurisdictions have gone further and forbade their officers to
cooperate with federal officials in the enforcement of some
aspects of the PATRIOT Act. The relevant prohibitions
typically prohibit local officials from cooperating only in
measures that violate federal constitutional rights.5 That
would not be exceptional in itself; after all, federal officials
likewise lack power to act in contravention of such rights. The
important point, however, is that these local jurisdiction seem
to reserve for themselves the authority to determine what
amounts to a violation of federal rights rather than deferring to
federal officials (or federal courts) on that issue." This
reservation of interpretive authority is important, given that
14 For an example of a typical resolution, see CITY OF AUSTIN, TEX.,
RESOLUTION No. 030925-66 (2003), available at http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/news/2003/
downloads/patriot act-res092503.pdf.
' The ordinance of the City of Arcata, California - which has received a great
deal of national media attention - includes the following two provisions:
SEC. 2191: No Unconstitutional Detentions or Profiling.
No management employee of the City shall officially engage in or
permit unlawful detentions or profiling based on race, ethnicity,
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, political or religious
association that are in violation of individuals' civil rights or civil
liberties as specified in the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
SEC. 2192: No Unconstitutional Voluntary Cooperation.
No management employee of the City shall officially assist or
voluntarily cooperate with investigations, interrogations, or arrest
procedures, public or clandestine, that are in violation of
individuals' civil rights or civil liberties as specified in the Bill of
Rights and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
CITY OF ARCATA, CALIFORNIA, ORDINANCE NO. 1339 (2003), available at
http://www.arcatacityhall.org/Ordinance%201339.html.
16 The Arcata ordinance, for example, provides for a procedure whereby the
city administration must notify the City Council if federal authorities make a request
for cooperation that would violate the ordinance's requirements, and provides that the
City shall provide legal defense for any city official prosecuted for actions in compliance
with the ordinance. See id. §§ 2193, 2194.
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the scope of the federal rights in question - rights against the
chilling of free expression, free association, search and seizure
safeguards, and equality norms against "profiling" and the like,
to name just a few examples - will often be deeply contested.
These assertions of interpretive autonomy by state
legislatures and local city councils recall a similar challenge to
federal supremacy two centuries ago in the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions." Those resolutions, authored by James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, respectively, protested
Congress's adoption of the Alien Friends Law, which allowed
the President to order deportation of aliens, and the Sedition
Law, which made seditious libel a federal criminal offense.1 8
Much like the PATRIOT Act, these laws were enacted to
enhance national security in the face of foreign threats; like the
anti-PATRIOT Act measures, the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions insisted that the federal laws overstepped the
bounds of national power and intruded too far on constitutional
liberties. Indeed, the Resolutions may have raised the more
specific issue of commandeering addressed by Professor
Althouse; as Wayne Moore has pointed out that, they were
issued "at a time when the Union depended heavily on
cooperation by state governments for enforcing federal laws,"
and at least Jefferson's version "apparently contemplated
disregard by state officials of the Alien and Sedition Acts.""
As I have already said, I am somewhat skeptical as to
whether the concerns voiced in the contemporary anti-
PATRIOT resolutions have much validity on the merits. These
state and local initiatives do, however, offer vivid evidence of
how federalism protects individual liberties. Much as they did
17 See generally Wayne D. Moore, Reconceiving Interpretive Autonomy:
Insights from the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 315
(1994).
I" See generally JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND
SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956); Moore, supra note 17; GARRY
WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT 134-52
(1999). The resolutions themselves may be found at 7 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
289-309 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1892-99) (Kentucky), and 17
JAMES MADISON, PAPERS 188-90 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds.,
U. Chi. Press 1962) (Virginia). In addition to their arguments that the federal statutes
were unconstitutional, the resolutions also articulated various theories of state
governmental authority over national law. See Moore, supra note 17, at 318
(distinguishing between "nullification, reversal, and interposition"). These more
extreme forms of governmental resistance are outside the scope of this essay.
19 Moore, supra note 17, at 321. This non-cooperation seems to have been
sufficient to foreclose any actual prosecutions under the Alien and Sedition Acts in
Kentucky.
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during the eighteenth century controversy over the Alien and
Sedition Acts, state and local governments have become a
rallying point for political opposition to national policy.
This Part focuses on that interaction between
federalism, political opposition, and liberty. Section A catalogs
the various institutional and political mechanisms by which
federalism protects liberty, each of which finds an illustration
in debates over the War on Terror. Section B explores the
relevance of the "political safeguards" of federalism, both as a
force tending to moderate state and local departures from
federal policy and as a possibly inadequate protection for
government-centered dissent. Finally, in Section C, I ask
whether the ability of state and local governments to mobilize
dissent ought not to be protected in the same way that we
protect other expressive organizations - that is, by according
them rights against governmental suppression under the First
Amendment.
A. Federalism and Liberty
It is worth remembering that the Framers' original
design focused entirely on structure: Specific enumerations of
human rights - probably the primary vehicle for talking about
liberty today - were added as a political concession following
ratification of the original document." That original document
built on the assumption that liberty was best secured through a
rigorous commitment to federalism and separation of powers.
As Madison argued in Federalist 51, these institutional
arrangements provide "a double security.., to the rights of the
people. The different governments will controul each other; at
the same time that each will be controuled by itself."'
Few would argue today that federalism and separation
of powers are a sufficient condition for individual liberty. The
Federalists probably deserved to lose the debate about the need
for enumerated freedoms, and few would choose to repeal the
Bill of Rights and take our chances with sole reliance on
structure. But our modern preoccupation with rights provisions
2' The original Constitution did contain a few specific rights guarantees, such
as the prohibition on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §
9, cl. 3. But most contemporary discussion of rights focuses on provisions added by
amendment later on.
2' THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961) (James Madison)
(emphasis added).
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may have encouraged us to overlook the possibility that
structure remains a necessary condition for liberty." Especially
in times of terror, rights provisions may become "parchment
barriers" ' to governmental oppression. Sometimes it takes a
government to check a government.
State and local institutions secure liberty in a number of
different ways. The first is by functioning as a rallying point for
political opposition to national policy.24 Individuals are often
ineffective speakers when they act alone; that is why First
Amendment doctrine has long protected the role of political
associations in mobilizing political expression. The Court
recognized a right of political association in NAACP v.
Alabama,2 for example, and has defended free speech rights for
corporations on the similar ground that they are effective
organizations for disseminating messages that the public has a
right to hear." Yet often the most effective organizations for
organizing and transmitting dissent are themselves
governmental institutions. This should hardly be surprising.
Such institutions, unlike private organizations, generally are
constitutionally required to be open to a variety of points of
view and responsive to the political will of the People. By
transmitting the political dissent of their constituents, state
and local resolutions against the PATRIOT Act reflect the
Founders' notion, embodied in the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions, that state and local governments should "act as
22 Cf Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("It would be a grave mistake.., to think a Bill of Rights in Madison's scheme then or
in sound constitutional theory now renders separation of powers of lesser
importance."). The same opinion emphasizes the importance of both horizontal and
vertical separation of powers - that is, federalism. See id. (noting that the Framers
"used the principles of separation of powers and federalism to secure liberty in the
fundamental political sense of the term, quite in addition to the idea of freedom from
intrusive governmental acts").
" See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 21, at 333 (James Madison) ("Will
it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments in the
Constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the
encroaching spirit of power?"). Madison is speaking here of formal demarcations of
separated powers, without institutional checks and balances, but his observation is
equally applicable to individual rights guarantees.
24 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 403
(1997) (observing that state governments "serve as an independent means of calling
forth the voice of the people"); Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New
Defense of the Anti-Commandeering Rule? 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309, 1324-25 (2000).
25 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (recognizing that "[e]ffective advocacy of both
public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
enhanced by group association").
26 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-86 (1978).
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intermediaries between the people and the federal
government."27 As Alexander Hamilton observed in Federalist
26, "the state Legislature . . . will constantly have their
attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers and will
be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to sound the
alarm to the people and not only to be the VOICE but if
necessary the ARM of their discontent."2
A second and related mechanism operates where state
and local politics serves as the seedbed for political change at
the national level. Turnover in government may be an effective
guarantee against tyranny; it assures that a particular faction
cannot become entrenched and unaccountable in power. Such
turnover may become more difficult where the political
opposition has no opportunity to demonstrate its own
competence to rule. As some observers of British politics have
noted, for example, the present "out" party - the Tories - have
no governmental sub-units in which they can gain practical
experience, try out new policies, and gain governing credibility
because Britain remains largely a unitary state.29 In America,
by contrast, the party that is "out" in Washington will almost
certainly be "in" in at least a couple of dozen states and
literally thousands of localities, and the experience of practical
governance at those levels often provides the springboard for
successful political takeovers at the national level."0 Four of our
last five Presidents were successful state governors at a time
when their party was out of power at the national level." It
should thus come as no surprise that in the early stages of the
27 Moore, supra note 17, at 335.
28 THE FEDERALIST No. 25, supra note 21, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton).
29 See A Tale of Two Legacies - Learning from the Republicans and the
Tories, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 2002 (arguing that the Tories "face problems in
imitating Mr. Bush [by regaining power at the national level] - not least because they
lack a testing ground for their ideas"). The new Devolution Acts, devolving some
legislative authority to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, may ultimately change
this dynamic. See generally Colin B. Picker, "A Light unto the Nations" - The New
British Federalism, the Scottish Parliament, and Constitutional Lessons for Multiethnic
States, 77 TULANE L. REV. 1 (2002); ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 1-2 (2003) (arguing
that the British constitution is less unitary than is often thought). But devolution is
unlikely to help the Tories in the short term, since the devolved regions have
traditionally not been hospitable to their party.
30 See Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. SCI. 66, 70-71 (2001) (noting historical examples in which "the existence of
state-level alternatives to the nationally dominant political orthodoxy has made an
electoral - if not a military - challenge to that orthodoxy more likely").
31 See E.J. Dionne, Jr., Govs 4, Senators 0. Tough Odds, WASH. POST, Jan. 4,
2004, at B1; David S. Broder, Required Reading on Dean, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2004,
at A19; One Cheer for the Democrats, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 9, 2002, at 34.
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2004 presidential race the candidate who voiced the most
effective criticism of the Bush Administration's War on Terror
was a former governor of Vermont. And even within a
particular political party, the necessities of governing and the
unique political cultures of individual states may spur state
politicians to oppose the party orthodoxy in Washington.'
What is true of politicians is also often true of social
movements. Both abolition and the civil rights movement
started at the state and local levels before they "went
national."33 So did many of the reform currents that came
together in the Progressive movement around the turn of the
last century." It should surprise no one that as civil
libertarians seek to persuade their fellow citizens of the
dangers they see lurking in the PATRIOT Act, most of their
initial successes have come in city councils and, less frequently,
in the state legislatures.
Professor Althouse notes a third mechanism: The ability
of state institutions to articulate an alternative - and possibly
broader - understanding of federal rights. As she explains, the
inability of Congress to "commandeer" Sheriff Printz to enforce
the Brady Act enabled him to act upon a broader view of
Second Amendment rights than the federal courts would likely
have been willing to recognize." Similarly, states like Oregon
that permit physician-assisted suicide may be influenced at
least in part by a broader view of due process than the U.S.
Supreme Court's; states like Massachusetts recognizing gay
marriage may likewise seek to articulate a broad view of due
process or equal protection not yet accepted in the federal
courts.3' Each of these visions has encountered opposition at the
32 See, e.g., A Green in Wolfs Clothing, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 2003,
(discussing Republican governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's support for environmental
protection in California); One Cheer for the Democrats, supra note 31, at 34 (observing
that "[i]n the 1990s the Republicans almost split into two parties: a pragmatic one
based in the governors' mansions, and an ideological one in Congress").
See, e.g., J. Morgan Kousser, "The Supremacy of Equal Rights" The
Struggle Against Racial Discrimination in Antebellum Massachusetts and the
Foundations of the Fourteenth Amendment, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 941 (1988) (describing
abolitionist efforts at the state level); TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA
IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-63, at 128-205 (1988) (chronicling the Montgomery bus
boycott).
See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, State Law and "Industrial Policy" in American
Development, 1790-1987, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 415, 432 (1987).
35 Althouse, supra note 2, at 1251-53.
36 The Massachusetts recognition of gay marriage rested on state
constitutional grounds. See Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948
(Mass. 2003). But such state provisions often provide a vehicle for articulating -
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national level, and their survival may depend in part on the
strength of federalism constraints on Congress's preemptive
power over state law.37
We see the same dynamic in the context of the War on
Terror. Constitutional concerns about the PATRIOT Act and
other anti-terrorism measures are widespread; they include, to
name just two examples, concerns about the erosions of Fourth
Amendment privacy and chilling effects on First Amendment
expression. Despite these concerns, however, few courts have
been willing thus far to invalidate any of the Act's provisions.'
It is thus Printz's anti-commandeering doctrine that creates
the constitutional space for state and local governments to
vindicate their own, possibly broader understandings of these
rights by refusing to participate in federal enforcement efforts
they consider suspect.
We might think of Professor Althouse's argument as a
limited form of state-based interpretive departmentalism. At
the federal level, the departmentalist position holds that the
branches of the federal government each have authority to
render final constitutional interpretations in certain
instances."9 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Bank of the United States in McCulloch v. Maryland," for
example, but it had no authority to stop President Andrew
Jackson from vetoing efforts to recharter the Bank based on his
without fear of Supreme Court reversal - an alternative view of federal rights. The
ultimate result in Massachusetts is, of course, clouded by the legislature's more recent
proposal of a state constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage (but approve civil
unions). See Mass. Takes Step Toward Gay Marriage Ban, USAToday.com, Mar. 29,
2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-03-29-mass-gay-
marriage x.htm. The Massachusetts amendment procedure is drawn out and highly
uncertain, making it hard to predict the ultimate result.
" Those constraints might take either of two forms. First, a narrow
construction of the Commerce Clause might deny federal power over marriage or
physician-assisted suicide. See, e.g., Stephanie Hendricks, Note, Pain Relief, Death
with Dignity, and Commerce: The Constitutionality of Congressional Attempts to
Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon via the Commerce Clause After Lopez
and Morrison, 37 WILLAMETE L. REV. 691 (2001); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold
Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA
L. REV. 1, 170-72 (1999) (discussing same-sex marriage). More likely, a strong version
of the presumption against preemption in statutory construction might raise the
legislative costs and narrow the scope of preemptive federal legislation.
But see Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (C.D.
Cal. 2004) (invalidating provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act barring the provision of
aid to designated terrorist organizations as unconstitutionally vague).
39 See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the
Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POLITICS 401, 411-12 (1986).
40 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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own interpretive conclusion that the Bank was constitutionally
illegitimate.' Wayne Moore has traced a state-based version of
departmentalism to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions,
suggesting that they "reflect an assumption that the states
have authority to interpret and exercise their powers even in
opposition to authoritative decisions by one or more federal
officials."2 It is doctrines like Printz - and Lopez - that make
space for this sort of autonomy: Because Congress may not
compel state and local officers to participate in federal law
enforcement efforts, states and localities may decide whether to
allow such participation based on their own views of whether
those enforcement efforts transgress constitutional norms.3
The final, simpler point is that the national
government's need for state and local cooperation may enhance
liberty by forcing national authorities to moderate their
positions. Requiring the consent of multiple actors before the
government can act is a pervasive institutional strategy in the
Constitution; it is most familiar, obviously, in separation of
powers where two distinct legislative organs and the Executive
Branch ordinarily must concur before a bill can become law."
The autonomy of state governmental institutions often
functions in the same way. The War on Terror is only one of a
wide range of governing activities that the national
government lacks the resources to undertake on its own.
Congress also depends on state implementation in areas
ranging from environmental law to welfare provision. Although
Washington possesses powerful levers by which to "persuade"
states to cooperate - such as the conditional spending power -
at some level it must still persuade state authorities thatfederal policy is sufficiently legitimate, wise, and fair to
41 See 2 UNITED STATES PRESIDENT: A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576, 581-83 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896). President
Jackson insisted that "[tihe authority of the Supreme Court must not.., be permitted
to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but
to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve." Id.
42 Moore, supra note 17, at 345.
As Professor Moore has demonstrated, this view of state interpretive
autonomy does not depend on the Virginia and Kentucky Resolution's more
controversial adoption of a "compact" theory of the Constitution, but rather on the more
widely-shared notion that the Constitution created a government of limited powers. See
Moore, supra note 17, at 348-51.
44 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism,
79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1332 (2001).
45 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995).
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warrant their participation. This need to rule by persuasion is
likely to force compromise and moderation across a wide range
of federal endeavors.
Again, the War on Terror illustrates the dynamic. State
and local authorities are likely to be willing, even eager, to
assist national anti-terrorism efforts in the vast majority of
cases. After all, the States' constituents are being protected,
too. But the formal declarations of reservations about the
PATRIOT Act discussed here are likely to be only the tip of the
iceberg in terms of state and local reluctance to cooperate with
measures that their citizens find extreme or unfair. On some
points, federal authorities may feel strongly enough about a
particular measure to devote scarce federal resources to it even
without state and local cooperation. But resource constraints
will almost inevitably dictate that this cannot be the norm, and
the need for state cooperation seems likely to force national
authorities to compromise and accommodate state objections
into federal policy. In some instances, such objections may
come to be seen as valuable feedback about a policy that all
acknowledge is a work in progress. That is no doubt one reason
why Viet Dinh, a former Justice Department lawyer and one of
the authors of the Act, recently welcomed the spate of state and
local resolutions as part of an ongoing intergovernmental
dialogue about appropriate anti-terrorism measures."6
Critics of federalism have often assumed that the
libertarian argument for state autonomy must rely on
apocalyptic scenarios in which the States somehow rise up and
oppose national tyranny through force of arms. 7 The dynamics
of the War on Terror, however, demonstrate the emptiness of
that canard. Federalism best protects liberty over time,
through the day-to-day operations of a government in which
nothing much can get done without the cooperation of multiple
actors at multiple levels. One must almost always be more
reasonable when one must persuade others in order to carry
out a policy. And those potential dissenters will surely have
more of an impact if they have their own governmental
institutions around which to organize their efforts, as well as
their own constitutional space in which to implement and
46 Viet Dinh, Remarks at the LBJ School of Government, Austin, TX
(November 2003). See also Richard B. Schmitt, Anti-terror Policy Under Criticism from
Ex-Insiders, HOuS. CHRON., Nov. 30, 2003, at 6.
47 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 928-29 (1994).
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demonstrate the effectiveness of alternative policies. In our
history, these dynamics have often come to the fore in times of
national stress, and the present tumult is no exception.
B. The Political Safeguards of National Policy
One irony of the debate over state and local opposition
to national anti-terrorism policy arises out of the fear that such
opposition will unduly jeopardize national security. Some
critics of the commandeering doctrine have suggested that it
may fatally undermine national anti-terrorism efforts."s The
irony stems from the tendency of such warnings to downplay
the immense political pressures that states and localities will
face to comply with federal initiatives. After all, proponents of
national power are fond of arguing that state governments can
protect themselves through the political process; these
nationalists thus reject the need for hard constitutional rules
requiring national authorities to respect their autonomy. 9 It
seems fair to wonder why similar political dynamics suddenly
become inadequate when we speak of protecting the national
side of the federal balance.
Justice Stevens' prescient dissent in Printz is an
example. There, Justice Stevens warned that the
commandeering doctrine might cripple federal policy in "times
of national emergency," when "[mlatters such as the enlistment
of air raid wardens, the administration of a military draft, the
mass inoculation of children to forestall an epidemic, or
perhaps the threat of an international terrorist, may require a
national response before federal personnel can be made
Justice Stevens's dissent in Printz itself, discussed infra notes 50-53 and
accompanying text, is the most prominent example. Most commentators seem to have
assumed instead that the Court would simply create an exception to Printz if national
security were at stake. See, e.g., Seth Waxman, Federalism, Law Enforcement, and the
Supremacy Clause: The Strange Case of Ruby Ridge, 51 KAN. L. REV. 141, 152 (2002)
('After September 11th, . . . it is difficult to imagine the Court treating lightly the
federal government's need to respond to problems of national dimension."). The
important point, however, is that few observers stress the political dynamics that
would buttress national authority in the terrorism context.
49 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-54
(1985); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 161-259 (1980).
This position has generally drawn inspiration from the more moderate view advanced
in Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954).
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available to respond."' But in the same opinion, Justice
Stevens emphasized "the political safeguards protecting Our
Federalism."51 "Given the fact that the Members of Congress
are elected by the people of the several States," he argued, "it is
quite unrealistic to assume that they will ignore the
sovereignty concerns of their constituents." 2 But the Justice
never explained why, given pervasive bonds of political party
and shared administration of existing programs that tie state,
local, and national officials together, as well as their common
accountability to the same constituents, state and local
governments would ignore a request for support from national
officials on a matter of imminent national emergency. Why do
we presume that federal officials look on the institutions of
state government with benign concern, but that state and local
officials will be recalcitrant and uncooperative unless the
national government can compel their obedience?
There are two obvious but contrasting explanations for
inconsistency on this point. One is that some opponents of
judicially-enforced federalism are really just opponents of
federalism per se. They do not really think "political
safeguards" are ever an adequate substitute for hard
constitutional rules providing or limiting power; rather, they
advance the political checks argument as a cover for the true
position that state autonomy is simply not worth protecting. I
certainly would not attribute this view to Justice Stevens; as I
have argued elsewhere, he has long been the most ardent
defender of state autonomy on questions involving the federal
preemption of state law.' But to the extent that many in the
academy probably do feel this way, it would surely be
preferable to simply debate the question whether federalism
serves important values - and whether courts are free to
disregard the state-protective principles embodied in the
Constitution's text and history - straight up. The surprising
political valence of state and local autonomy in the terrorism
50 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 940 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
" Id. at 957.
52 Id. at 956. Justice Stevens also joined Justice Blackmun's majority opinion
in Garcia, which is the locus classicus of the modern "political safeguards" argument.
See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530.
" See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV.
1349, 1380-84 (2001). For an example of Justice Stevens's defense of state autonomy,
see Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 887 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
[Vol. 69:41292
LIBERALS REDISCOVER FEDERALISM
context may, of course, have an important influence on that
debate.
The second plausible explanation is that some advocates
of the "political safeguards" thesis may sour on it when it
comes to protecting national policy. That is only natural: One
tends to examine arguments more critically when they
threaten values one personally holds dear, and nationally-
oriented academics (most of whom teach at "national" law
schools) may subject the notion of informal guarantees to more
searching scrutiny when they are no longer simply protections
for often-benighted state policies. That scrutiny would be
welcome, even if it raises the same sort of opportunism
questions I consider in Part II of this essay. It is likely to take
us closer to what I suspect is the truth of the matter: That
political safeguards are important in many instances, but
unlikely to be a sufficient protection for either state autonomy
or national power in all conceivable instances.
A third possibility is that political safeguards actually
do work better for states than for the national government. The
particular political mechanisms involved in each case are
different, and it is at least logically possible that the
mechanisms protecting state autonomy are stronger than those
protecting national power. But any realistic appraisal suggests
that the opposite is more likely to be true. The classic "political
safeguards" mechanisms protecting state autonomy posited by
Herbert Wechsler and others - primarily, the representation of
the States in Congress - have been dissected elsewhere and
arguably rejected even by the nationalists on the Court." In
particular, federal representatives are at best unreliable
partisans of state political institutions; in many instances, they
may view state politicians as competitors for power.' More
54 I develop that view in Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two
Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming Fall 2004).
5 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 220-27 (2000); Saikrishna B.
Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism
Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism
and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DuKE L.J. 75 (2001). For the Court's
arguable rejection, see U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 821 (1995)
(rejecting the notion that members of Congress serve on behalf of state political
institutions rather than the citizens directly). It's hardly surprising, however, that the
nationalist justices in the Term Limits majority would reject Garcia's theory of
representation in a case where that theory favored state autonomy.
See, e.g., ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 9-10
(2001) (explaining why national politicians have incentives to take over local
responsibilities from state and local politicians); id. at 29 (observing that when
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recent scholarship has suggested that states are instead
protected by various intermediary institutions - primarily
political parties and cooperative bureaucratic arrangements -
that tie the fate of state and national politicians together." But
these institutions are two-way streets and most likely protect
national authority as often as they protect states.' National
power, however, also benefits from Congress's ability to
withhold critical federal resources upon which states have
become dependent, as well as the President's ability to rally
national opinion against recalcitrant states. On balance, the
political process would seem to protect national authority at
least as well as it does states - and probably better.
The debate over commandeering and the War on Terror
thus raises two salient points about the "political safeguards"
of federalism. First, fears that state and local opposition will
cripple national anti-terrorism efforts are surely overblown.
Most of the time, immense political pressure - as well as
legitimate concern for public safety, of course - will cause
states and localities to do whatever national authorities ask."'
The second point, however, is that nationalist worries that
political safeguards might fail in important instances ought to
cause everyone to think twice about exclusive reliance on such
Congress does devolve power to states, it is likely to do so to shift responsibility for
costly failures).
57 See Kramer, supra note 55, at 278-87. Professor Kramer's view is criticized
in Prakash & Yoo, supra note 55, and Baker & Young, supra note 55. I suspect that the
truth of the matter is that political parties and shared administration protect states
some of the time, but probably not as often as Kramer supposes.
The linkage between national and state political parties may also cause
partisan warfare at the center to undermine local governance. The recent battles in the
Texas legislature over congressional redistricting illustrate how political parties at the
national level may distort internal state politics. See, e.g., Laylan Copelin & Michele
Kay, D.C. Keeps Eye on Special Session, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, June 19, 2003,
available at http://www.statesman.com/legislature/content/coxnet/texas/
legislature0603/0619perry.html (describing pressure on Texas state officials from
House Majority Leader Tom Delay and presidential advisor Karl Rove to convene a
contentious special legislative session to re-draw federal House districts, in order to
help Republican party fortunes in Congress); Dave Harmon, Representatives Seek
Senate's Help for Threatened Bills, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, May 14, 2003,
available at http://www.statesman.com/hp/content/coxnet/texas/legislature/
0 5 0 3 /
0515deadbills.html (describing how the attempt to push redistricting legislation
through the state legislature, at the behest of federal officials, endangered important
state legislation).
59 These pressures should at least be enough to overcome libertarian
resistance to anti-terror measures in most jurisdictions. The more doubtful question
arises from the massive financial and other resource costs that the War on Terror
imposes on states and localities. See Jack Weiss, Orange Crunch, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2004, at A19. As anti-terror begins to trade off with core law enforcement priorities,
pressures to opt out of federal measures may increase.
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safeguards in the reverse situation - that is, when the question
is protecting state autonomy. I discuss one such situation in
the next section.
C. State and Local Dissent as Protected Expression
If one of the ways that state and local governments
protect liberty is by mobilizing dissent against national
policies, then maybe it's time we started taking these activities
seriously as dissent. Dissenting political views held by private
entities, of course, are protected from suppression through the
First Amendment. I have already laid out the basic rationale
for extending similar protection to state and local governments:
They provide an institutional means, much like political
associations and corporations, for mobilizing and organizing
the expressive activities of individuals. Judge Richard Posner
has thus observed that "[t]o the extent ... that a municipality
is the voice of its residents - is, indeed, a megaphone
amplifying voices that might not otherwise be audible - a
curtailment of its right to speak might be thought a
curtailment of the unquestioned First Amendment rights of
those residents."' But courts and commentators have generally
been reluctant to extend such protection to state and local
governments. 1 A definitive resolution of that issue would take
far more space than I can give it here,2 but I do want to make a
few preliminary observations suggesting that the question is
worth pursuing.
The text of the First Amendment itself is specific as to
who may not restrict speech - "Congress shall make no law" -
but not as to whose speech is protected. A plausible first cut at
the text would be that no one's speech may be restricted,
whether they are an individual, a corporation, or a political
institution. Indeed, the Court's decisions upholding the free
speech rights of corporations have insisted that "[tihe identity
60 Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 80 F.3d. 186, 193 (7th Cir. 1996).
6' See, e.g., National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 61 (1st
Cir. 1999) (expressing doubt whether a state possesses First Amendment rights
against federal regulation), affd on other grounds, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
62 See, e.g., Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives
and Free Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 1, 33-47 (1999); Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of
Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CALIF. L.
REV. 1229, 1258-66 (1991).
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of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is
protected. Corporations and other associations, like
individuals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas' that the First
Amendment seeks to foster."' If "the identity of the speaker is
not decisive," then it is hard to see why this reasoning should
not be extended to state and local governments. And in fact, as
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions demonstrated in the
early Republic, those sorts of governmental institutions have
played an important part in articulating political dissent. As
Akhil Amar has noted, "state governments in 1798-99 played a
role similar to that of the institutional press or the opposition
party today: monitoring the conduct of officials in power, and
coordinating opposition to central policies deemed
undesirable."6
What seems to have happened is that, in the wake of
the movement to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the
States, state and local governments have come to be seen
almost exclusively as potential censors rather than as
rightholders under the Free Speech Clause. But nothing
logically precludes an entity from taking on either role,
depending on the circumstances. Private actors may, for
instance, be classified as state actors in certain circumstances
and become bound not to restrict the speech of others;' few
would argue, however, that such actors do not retain their own
speech rights as well. Likewise, it is clear that government
employees retain important free speech rights even though
they are part of the government and therefore bound to respect
the speech rights of others."
One might argue that government employees have no
right to freedom of expression when they speak on behalf of the
government in their official capacity. Hence, the "official"
political positions taken by state and local governments cannot
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
6 Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI.
L. REv. 483, 504 (1991).
See, e.g., Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Assn., 531 U.S. 288 (2001) (holding that a statewide interscholastic athletic association
of both public and private schools was sufficiently "entwined" with government
activities to be subject to the First Amendment); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946) (holding that private authorities in a "company town" are bound by the First
Amendment).
See, e.g., Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983); Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968).
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be protected speech. A typical argument thus insists that "[t]he
common understanding of the First Amendment as a limit on
government, rather than a license for it to speak, is natural
given the language of the amendment . . . . To transform a
restriction on government into a positive right vested in the
state would do violence to the Amendment's language." ' But
the "government" is not a unitary entity in our system. The
First Amendment's text refers specifically to "Congress"
making "no law," and we know that some of the most important
dissent from congressional measures in the early republic came
from state governments. State and local governments are not
speaking on behalf of the national government when they
oppose national policy; the foundation of our system of dual
sovereignty is that the national and state governments are
separate entities, each accountable to the People through
independent channels and not directly accountable to one
another.' Nor does the incorporation of the First Amendment
into the Fourteenth, so that it binds state and local
governments as well as Congress, change this argument. The
fact that private individuals now have speech rights against
both the national and state governments does not logically
entail that state governments do not retain similar rights
against the center.
Another line of argument would assert that state and
local institutions are not persons and thus should not bear the
same rights as individuals. But we crossed that firebreak long
ago when we accorded rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to associations and corporations." The Court has
long recognized the critical role that private associations like
the NAACP play in organizing and amplifying divergent
political views, as well as the individual interest in hearing the
ideas that associations and corporations disseminate.
Moreover, one of the principal objections to corporate speech
rights - that corporations enjoy an unfair advantage in the
political marketplace because of the accumulations of capital
they represent - is probably less applicable to state and local
governments. Not only are some states and many localities
likely to be poorer than many corporations, governments can be
67 James Forman, Note, Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Confederate Flag
from Southern State Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505, 518-19 (1991).
68 See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838-42 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
69 See, e.g., Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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held democratically accountable for their expressive activities
in ways the corporations cannot."
State and local governments do differ from individuals
and private corporations to the extent that actions by
governmental institutions may have the force of law. Often,
however, this is not the case. Most of the resolutions adopted
by state and local governments condemning the PATRIOT Act
have no legal force; they simply express those governments'
disapproval of what Congress has done. It is hard to see how
any principled distinction could be drawn between such
resolutions and similar political speech by a private actor. Any
effort by Congress to ban these anti-PATRIOT Act resolutions
would be instantly recognizable as censorship, and that is no
doubt why Congress has made no effort to do so."
The more difficult questions arise when we move to
governmental actions that have both expressive and regulatory
components. A local measure might, for example, forbid federal
agents operating within the city to conduct surveillance
authorized by the PATRIOT Act. According First Amendment
protection to such a measure would pose a serious threat to the
supremacy of federal law. Any law that a state or locality
enacts has an expressive component: It embodies a particular
view on a question of public policy. (If nude dancing has a
sufficient expressive component to be "speech,"72 then surely an
enacted law will always qualify.) But the Supremacy Clause
clearly requires that state law must yield in the face of a
conflict with a valid federal statute. A state might decide to
make a political statement in favor of economic growth over
environmental protection, for example, by enacting a law
70 See Porterfield, supra note 62, at 33.
71 One might invalidate such a ban without ascribing First Amendment
rights to governmental actors, I suppose, by arguing that the national government
simply lacks any enumerated power to restrict these sorts of state or local action. I
doubt whether the enumerated power approach gets us very far, however. Some forms
of non-regulatory, expressive activity - such as a state pension fund's refusal to invest
in South Africa under apartheid - would plainly be commercial activity that falls
within Congress's power under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Moreover,
many state and local resolutions - including the USA PATRIOT Act resolutions - deal
with subjects that at least arguably bear on foreign affairs. In that area, the federal
courts have held state laws dealing with non-commercial subjects preempted by a
general "foreign affairs power" even in the absence of federal legislative action. See
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). The enumerated powers doctrine is thus likely
to provide only sporadic protection, at best, to state and local expressions of
disagreement with federal policy.
72 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991) (plurality
opinion).
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authorizing industry to pollute as much as it likes. No one
doubts, however, that such a law would be preempted by
federal environmental measures requiring stricter pollution
controls - notwithstanding the fact that the state law could be
properly viewed as a piece of political expression.
National supremacy means that state and local
governments probably cannot enjoy the same free speech rights
that private individuals, associations, and corporations enjoy.
Contemporary First Amendment doctrine has generally been
unwilling to draw a sharp distinction between speech and
conduct. The relevant questions are generally whether the
conduct in fact expresses a message and whether the
government's regulation is directed at that message. 3 Where
subnational governments are the speakers, we are likely to
need something more like a line between actions that simply
express the state or locality's own view and those that regulate
or otherwise confer legal obligations on others. While these
sorts of lines may not always be easy to draw, they are unlikely
to be significantly more difficult than any number of other
doctrinal distinctions in contemporary free speech law. The
point is simply that that law will require significant doctrinal
adaptations where governmental speakers are involved.
Another reason that state and local governments might
enjoy comparatively less freedom of expression than
individuals is that - unlike private parties - governmental
bodies are also the object of constitutional restrictions. Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, state actors are
bound by an obligation not to discriminate that is of equal
constitutional dignity as the First Amendment that creates
rights of free expression. The Seventh Circuit has thus held
that "[elven if municipalities do have First Amendment rights.
. . we do not think they have the right to foment, whether
through speech or otherwise, governmental discrimination on
grounds of race.""4 One might similarly argue that a local
government could not subsidize an exhibition of Andres
Serrano's "Piss Christ," a photo depicting a crucifix immersed
in the artist's urine, on the ground that the exhibition would
constitute hate speech in violation of the government's
constitutional obligation not to discriminate against religious
" See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385-86 (1992); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
74 Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 80 F.3d. 186, 193 (7th Cir. 1996).
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groups.75 Although the government's ability to restrict such
exhibitions would present a more serious question,"6 its ability
to promote them would turn not only on the contours of the free
speech right but also on the restrictions imposed by the Equal
Protection Clause, as well as the First Amendment's religion
clauses. That analysis would likely produce a considerably
narrower right of governmental speech than a private
individual would enjoy in the same situation.
Finally, we might worry that, even when state or local
governments express views without any regulatory effect, those
views might have uniquely harmful consequences arising from
their source in a governmental body. Suppose, for example, a
local city council announces to its citizens that the PATRIOT
Act is unconstitutional and invalid, and further urges them not
to cooperate with investigative requests from federal officials.
Such an announcement might be intended simply as expression
of an opinion with no regulatory effect, but because it comes
from a governmental body its audience might misconstrue it as
either an authoritative decision that the Act is invalid or, even
worse, a binding governmental directive not to comply. Again,
such possibilities show why the First Amendment rights of
governmental entities might ought not to be construed as
broadly as those of individuals; we might want a lower
standard for holding government speech to be unprotected
incitement, for example.7 But such hypotheticals do not, in my
view, establish that state and local governments should enjoy
no speech protections at all.
The anti-commandeering doctrine may serve as one
workable accommodation of state and local expressive
interests, despite the fact that the Court has never justified it
in precisely those terms. Modern First Amendment doctrine
recognizes a robust right against compelled speech; as Chief
Justice Burger observed in Wooley v. Maynard, the Free Speech
75 For a description of the Serrano controversy, see Jacqueline Trescott, NEA
Balks At Funding Serrano: Critics See Rejection As Politically Motivated, WASH. POST,
Aug. 6, 1994, at Cl. For a similar controversy that occurred not far from the site of this
symposium, see Kit R. Roane, Arguments Heard in Museum's Legal Battle With Mayor,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1999, at B6.
76 There is a vast literature on hate speech, most of it focusing on race rather
than religion. See, e.g., MARl J. MATSUDA, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
77 Compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (permitting
restriction of private incitement only "where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
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Clause protects "both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all."78 Indeed, one of the few cases in
which the Supreme Court has recognized that state
governmental entities enjoy First Amendment interests
involved precisely this right not to speak." From this
standpoint, it makes sense to say that national authorities
cannot compel state or local officials to express support for
federal policy by participating in the enforcement of measures
with which they disagree. Commandeering thus distorts the
political process - a central concern of both federalism and
speech doctrine - not only by blurring lines of political
accountability but also by undermining the ability of state and
local governments to articulate a different point of view.
I do not want to suggest that this is the only legitimate
justification for the anti-commandeering doctrine, or that that
doctrine exhausts the circumstances in which the First
Amendment ought to protect state autonomy. Nonetheless, this
way of thinking about commandeering may have the twin
virtues of placing that doctrine on a firmer constitutional
footing in some circumstances and of making it easier for
liberals to swallow. Liberals have traditionally embraced
speech rights, after all, while viewing "states' rights" with
considerable suspicion. But the conjunction of federalism and
rights concerns in the commandeering context is only one of a
vast range of linkages that ought to lead liberals to embrace
state autonomy in a much broader range of circumstances. I
turn to that issue in the next Part.
III. CONSERVATIVES, LIBERALS, AND STATE AUTONOMY
The readiness of some political liberals to embrace state
autonomy as a means of opposing the War on Terror represents
something of a shift in the traditional political valence of
federalism disputes. Liberals have generally viewed state
autonomy with profound suspicion. Many have agreed with a
much-cited diatribe by Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley that
"there is no normative principle involved [in federalism] that is
78 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
'9 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674-75
(1998) (holding that a state public television station had a protected First Amendment
interest in deciding which candidates to include, and which to exclude, in a televised
political debate).
For a similar argument, see Cox, supra note 24.
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worthy of protection.""1 I argue in Section A of this Part that
this suspicion is misplaced at this point in our history. Liberals
are right to embrace federalism; the odd point is that it has
taken them so long to do it.
Any such embrace does raise questions of opportunism,
however. Some may see newfound support of state autonomy as
hypocritical, given longstanding liberal opposition to state
power in the past. I suggest in Section B that there is nothing
inherently wrong with such opportunism; in fact, the Founders
anticipated that precisely this sort of political self-interest
would play a crucial role in maintaining the balance of our
constitutional structure. It does seem likely, however, that
structural arguments either for or against state autonomy will
be taken more seriously if they are advanced in a principled
fashion - that is, if advocates of particular structural
arrangements demonstrate their willingness to defend those
arrangements even when they do not like the political
consequences.
A. It's About Time
The War on Terror is not the only issue on which state
autonomy may serve politically liberal goals. Particular states
recently have staked out more progressive positions than the
national government on issues ranging from global warming to
gay marriage, and political liberals have begun to criticize the
shifting of authority from the states to the nation on issues
from education to health care. Although many liberals have
begun to support state autonomy on a number of these issues,
one often detects the same discomfort that one sees in
commentary on the War on Terror. Referring to Democratic
presidential candidates' criticism of the federalization of
education policy, for example, one liberal advocate opined that
"[w]hen you start to hear national Democrats talking as if they
are keynote speakers at the Federalist Society, that should be a
cause for concern.""2
I think that instinct is profoundly mistaken. The first
point is that, to someone of my own (post-Baby Boom)
generation, liberal antipathy to federalism seems so Sixties.
81 Rubin & Feeley, supra note 47, at 909.
12 Kate Zemike, "No Child Left Behind" Brings a Reversal: Democrats Fault a
Federal Education Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2004, at A16 (quoting Andrew J.
Rotherham, director of education policy for the Progressive Policy Institute).
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Seth Kreimer, for instance, has said that "[iun my formative
years as a lawyer and legal scholar, during the late 1960s and
1970s, [federalism] was regularly invoked as a bulwark against
federal efforts to prevent racial oppression, political
persecution, and police misconduct."' That sentiment is surely
understandable, and it probably explains much liberal
opposition to federalism in the academy. But while I would
never claim that these wars - against racism, for instance -
have been won, I do think it is fair to say that the battle to
federalize those subjects is over." We remain a society divided
over race, but few would dispute today that the answers to
most racial questions, such as affirmative action, must be
sought in national terms.
On many of the rights issues that retain a federalism
dimension, by contrast, it is far from clear that liberal distrust
of state autonomy makes sense. Some of the most recent
controversies at the intersection of federalism and rights have
involved physician-assisted suicide, gay marriage, and medical
marijuana. Each of these questions has pitted particular states
taking a progressive stance - Oregon's protection of the right to
die, Massachusetts' and Vermont's moves to authorize gay
marriage, and California's legalization of some medical
marijuana use - against strong efforts at the national level to
stifle those experiments. The best hope of defending these
"liberal" state positions, moreover, may lie in arguing
limitations on the scope of the national Commerce Power or
restrained notions of federal preemption rather than in
reliance on claims of individual right."
Professor Finkelman's contribution to the present
symposium offers a case study in liberal suspicion of state and
local institutions.' He argues that while Justice Stevens's
Printz dissent was correct to predict that denying Congress the
right to commandeer state and local law enforcement would
Kreimer, supra note 30, at 67.
84 See Baker & Young, supra note 55, at 147-49.
See, e.g., Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
plaintiffs challenging federal prohibitions on medical marijuana use were entitled to a
preliminary injunction on Commerce Clause grounds); see also Conant v. Walters, 309
F.3d 629, 645-47 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (making an anti-
commandeering argument against aspects of the federal law restricting medical
marijuana use); Stephanie Hendricks, supra note 37; Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 37
(discussing same-sex marriage).
Paul Finkelman, The Roots of Printz: Proslavery Constitutionalism,
National Law Enforcement, Federalism, and Local Cooperation, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
1399 (2004).
2004] 1303
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
lead to an expansion of the national police force, we should
embrace this scenario because federal law enforcement is more
respectful of rights. "The willingness of states to oppress
religious and ethnic minorities is well known," he asserts.7 But
it is instructive to look at the sources Professor Finkelman cites
for that proposition: Meyer v. Nebraska,' a case decided in
1923, and a book about "nativism" in education during the
period 1917-1927."9 More recent examples could no doubt be
cited, although whether one could find enough to support
Finkelman's on-balance judgment of state and local inferiority
is far less clear. As William Stuntz has pointed out, two of the
most important constraints on police misconduct are
democratic accountability and resource limitations, and these
restrict local law enforcement to a far greater extent than they
do federal authorities.' What is more fascinating, however, is
the willingness of many liberals simply to assume that if state
and local officials were less respectful of liberty than their
federal counterparts in the 1920s, the same must be true today.
Professor Chemerinsky's entry provides a useful
corrective to this sort of assumption, identifying a different but
related set of issues." His essay focuses on a large class of cases
involving preemption of state law by federal statutes. Such
cases, as I have pointed out elsewhere, implicate the core of the
States' capacity to govern themselves; federal preemption, after
all, displaces state law in favor of policies enacted at the
national level. Moreover, preemption cases generally involve a
87 Id. at 1416.
8B 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (involving a state law prohibiting the teaching of
foreign languages to young children).
89 See Finkelman, supra note 86, at 1416 n.58 (citing Meyer and WILLIAM G.
ROSS, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM, EDUCATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-
1927 (1995)).
90 See Stuntz, supra note 11, at 674:
[Tihis much is clear: the FBI is less accountable than local police forces ....
FBI agents also have more freedom to target the wrong people than do local
cops - in part because the local cops have primary responsibility for day-to-
day law enforcement. If we are to add to the FBI's power, we would do well to
worry about those two problems.
91 See Chemerinsky, supra note 4.
'0 See Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of
Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 39-40 (arguing that preemption cases are much more
important for state autonomy than cases involving state sovereign immunity, despite
the Court's focus on the latter); Young, Two Cheers, supra note 53, at 1375-76 (arguing
that preemption cases are the most important class of federalism cases from the
perspective of state autonomy); see also S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and
Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 694 (1991) (noting the "jurispathic" effect
of federal preemption in killing off state policy choices). For the notion of "jurispathic"
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regulated entity - usually a business - challenging relatively
rigorous state regulation on the ground that it conflicts with a
more lenient regulatory regime adopted in Washington, D.C.
To the extent that liberals often favor more rigorous regulation
of business and industry, then, they ought usually to take the
pro-states side in preemption cases. And, in fact, the pattern
that emerges in Supreme Court preemption opinions reflects
this political tendency while standing the Justices' usual
positions about federalism on their head: The
liberal/nationalists on the Court, such as Justice Stevens, tend
to vote for the States and against preemption, while the
conservatives/states-righters interpret federal measures
broadly to preempt state law. 3 I am not as ready as Professor
Chemerinsky to explain this pattern purely in terms of political
ideology; the pattern of results, in my view, is too complicated
and there are too many cross-cutting variables, such as judicial
philosophies of statutory construction.' Nonetheless, the
preemption cases offer a large class of contested federalism
issues in which the pro-states side has been more congenial to
political progressives.
One hopes that current controversy over the state and
local anti-PATRIOT resolutions may encourage more liberal
jurists and scholars to be open to federalism-based arguments
in contexts beyond preemption of state regulation. I have
already noted the example of Justice Stevens, who has been a
champion of state autonomy in preemption cases but has little
use for the anti-commandeering doctrine. But perhaps if we see
that doctrine as fostering state and local dissent from
potentially repressive national policies, and as shielding state
authority to interpret the Constitution more generously than
federal actors who claim interpretive supremacy, then Printz
will look considerably more appealing to progressives. It may
be too much to hope that the Court's nationalists will
effects, see generally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword -
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983).
93 For some representative decisions, see, for example, Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), and Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861
(2000). Several scholars in addition to Professor Chemerinsky have noted this pattern.
See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343,
362-78; Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431,
502-12 (2002); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHi. L. REV. 429, 429-30 (2002); Young, Two Cheers, supra
note 53, at 1349. I develop and analyze this pattern at much greater length in Young,
The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, supra note 54.
See Young, Two Cheers, supra note 53, at 1384.
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reconsider some of their prior dissents, but perhaps they might
moderate their unusually adamant opposition - embodied in
vows to disregard stare decisis and continue dissenting
indefinitely"' - to the Court's federalism precedents.
It is hardly true, of course, that all states take a more
progressive position than the national government on
contemporary issues like environmental policy or gay marriage.
But that is precisely the point. National authority can be an
effective tool for imposing rights supported by a national
consensus on outlier states that refuse to go along. As my
colleague Scot Powe has argued, this is basically what
happened on race and related issues during the 1960s as a
national majority, persuaded of at least some basic
commitment to racial equality, imposed its more progressive
views on a recalcitrant South.' But where no such consensus
has been achieved, resolution of a rights issue at the federal
level may well stifle progressive change. That is certainly the
intent behind at least some aspects of the federal Defense of
Marriage Act and, more clearly, proposals for a federal
constitutional amendment banning gay marriage.97 It is only
95 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina St. Ports Auth., 535 U.S.
743, 788 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision reaffirms the need for
continued dissent - unless the consequences of the Court's approach prove anodyne, as
I hope, rather than randomly destructive, as I fear."); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 98-99 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that "[the kind of judicial
activism manifested in [the Court's 11th Amendment cases] represents such a radical
departure from the proper role of this Court that it should be opposed whenever the
opportunity arises"); see also Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School
Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 178 (2002) (observing that "[sluch explicit
commitments to keep dissenting until the dissent becomes the doctrine of the Court are
rare"). It may be that the dissenters' unwillingness to accord stare decisis effect to the
Court's federalism decisions is confined to the Eleventh Amendment cases, which are
harder to see in libertarian terms. We simply don't have enough commandeering or
commerce clause cases to tell for sure. But certainly we have no evidence of the Printz
and Lopez dissenters' willingness to accept the legitimacy of those decisions in future
cases.
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2001). I
would certainly not argue that we have reached national consensus on race issues in
general, but I think it is safe to say that the basic equality norms embodied in the 1964
Civil Rights Act or the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition on overt, malign racial
discrimination enjoy far broader popular support than, say, a right to gay marriage.
See, e.g., US Opposed to Gay Marriage, BIRMINGHAM POST, Apr. 12, 2004, at 9
(reporting that respondents to a poll opposed gay marriage by a margin of 55 to 41
percent).
97 Eugene Volokh has argued - persuasively, in my view - that the portion of
the Defense of Marriage Act that relieves states of their full faith and credit obligations
to recognize gay marriages permitted in other states may actually promote social
change on this issue. Email posting of Eugene Volokh, CONLAWPROF listserv (Nov.
18, 2003) (on file with author; cited with permission). The reason is that if, say,
Vermont's recognition of gay marriage can bind all other states to recognize such
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natural that people who fervently believe in an individual right
or some other aspect of reform would want that reform
implemented uniformly across the nation. But the hope that
the national government will do the "right thing" right away in
every case is utopian. In many instances, incremental change
beginning at the state and local level will be the best hope for
progressive reform.
The politics of the last decade ought to reinforce this
point. For many decades it seemed like the Democratic Party's
dominance of Congress would never end, and many liberals no
doubt derived their preference for national power from that
political fact. But it did end, and now the Republican Party
controls all three branches of the national government. 8 Long-
term demographic trends, as well as redistricting measures in
several crucial states, point toward long-term Republican
control of Congress even if the Presidency remains
competitive.' Republican primacy in national politics may still,
of course, come crashing down tomorrow. But surely liberals
would do well to hedge their bets on that score. In the
meantime, their interests will often lie both in promoting
progressive reform at the state level and in defending the
structural principles that will make those local victories stick.
All this points to a truth that history well bears out: The
political valences of national power and state autonomy
constantly have shifted back and forth throughout our history.
In the Progressive Era, liberals were often based in the states
and distrusted federal (particularly federal judicial) power; ' in
the 1960s and 1970s, the opposite was more often true. Prior to
the Civil War, slaveholders relied on federal authority to
recover escaped slaves, while more enlightened state
governments in the North sought to preserve some modicum of
unions entered into in Vermont, then any state opposed to the practice has a stake in
snuffing out Vermont's policy. Better, Professor Volokh argues, to defuse this pressure
for a national solution and let each state determine how to handle the issue on its own.
The critical point, however, is that this aspect of the Defense of Marriage Act may
facilitate incremental reform precisely by decentralizing resolution of the issue. See
also States Represent Best Forums for Gay-Marriage Debate, USAToday.com, April 1,
2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2004-04-01-our-
viewx.htm.
98 See Baker & Young, supra note 55, at 151.
See Eatanswill Revisited: America's Election, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 31,
2004.
100 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 1-2, 12-16 (2000).
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due process for accused escapees.' It is an ahistorical mistake
to take the particular political patterns of the last third of a
century for immutable structural truth. One simply cannot
ascribe a reliable political tendency to federalism.'0 '
B. The Legitimacy (and Perils) of Opportunism
Perhaps one reason that political liberals have been
reluctant to embrace federalism, even in situations like the
War on Terror where state autonomy may promote their
interests, is that they fear appearing opportunistic. Certainly
the tone of much commentary in the popular press - accusing
Republicans of hypocrisy for proposing national measures when
they are supposed to be the party of "states' rights," for
example - suggests something wrong with choosing structural
principles based on short-term political advantage."n And,
indeed, I want ultimately to suggest that such a short-term
strategy is not a great idea. I do think, however, that the case
for opportunism is somewhat stronger than some might think.
In fact, such opportunism seems to be exactly what our
Founders expected - and counted upon.
Consider, for instance, Madison's discussion of
structural safeguards in Federalist 51." One interesting aspect
of that essay is that it treats the division of power among
different institutions as both a safeguard of liberty in its own
right and, on the other hand, as a somewhat fragile
arrangement that must itself be protected against "a gradual
'o' See Finkelman, supra note 86; Baker & Young, supra note 55, at 121-24.
102 One can argue that, to the extent federalism fosters incremental change
and caters to risk aversion about political defeat at the national level, it is inherently
related to a Burkean form of conservatism. But that is quite different from the sort of
conservative/liberal dichotomy that we generally refer to when we speak of
contemporary politics. See generally Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 8, at 1181-
1203.
103 See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., When States'Rights Get in the Way, WASH. POST,
June 25, 2002, at A19:
"The doctrine of states' rights, so often invoked as a principle, is almost
always a pretext to deny the federal government authority to do things that
conservatives dislike .... How do I know this? Because when states have the
temerity to try doing [progressive] things .... conservatives are quick to use
federal power to stop them from exercising their right to act."
104 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 21 (James Madison). Madison's
discussion seems most immediately directed at separation of powers within the
national government, but there is little doubt that it applies to federalism as well. Both
federalism and separation of powers are part of the "double security" for the "rights of
the people" that figures prominently in the essay. See id. at 351.
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concentration of the several powers in the same department.' 0 5
Madison's answer to this danger is to rely on opportunism: We
must give "to those who administer each department, the
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist
encroachments of the others." Hence, "[a]mbition must be made
to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be
connected with the constitutional rights of the place."" We do
not hope for individuals to defend structural arrangements out
of principled commitment; rather, the system operates by a
"policy of supplying by opposite and rival interests, the defect
of better motives. " "'
Just as we have misgivings about opportunism today,
this sort of solution was not intrinsically appealing to a
generation used to thinking in terms of republican virtue.
Madison acknowledges that "[i]t may be a reflection on human
nature, that such devices should be necessary to controul the
abuses of government." 8 He does not linger long over what
cannot be helped, however. "But what is government but the
greatest of all reflections on human nature?" he asks. "If men
were angels, no government would be necessary.""° We may
praise republican virtue when we find it, then, but the system
must be built in such a way as to hold together even when
principled commitment is lacking.
If anything, the issue-based calculations that motivate
political liberals and conservatives to embrace and discard
federalism may be an improvement on the more venal,
patronage-type motivations that Madison seemed to have most
directly in mind. In any event, the main point is that there is
nothing inherently surprising or wrong about political factions
embracing state autonomy when that structural principle
supports their preferred policy outcomes. The most reliable
"political safeguard of federalism" in the Founders' scheme is
not the hope the federal representatives will be mindful of the
institutional interests of their state governmental counterparts
back home; rather, it is that whenever a particular federal
measure is proposed, the people opposed to that measure on its
policy merits will have an incentive to argue that the matter
should be left to the States.
"05 Id. at 349.
"6 Id. (emphasis added).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
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At the same time, I do think that one can raise a
pragmatic objection to too much opportunism in structural
matters. Anytime a proponent or opponent of a particular
measure bolsters the policy argument for that measure on the
merits with an argument from structural principle, the reason
must be that the advocate thinks this additional structural
argument will make a difference with some members of his
audience. In other words, the choice to engage in structural
argument presupposes some subset of decision makers who do
not feel sufficiently strongly about the policy merits to be
persuaded on those grounds alone, but who do care about
structure. I will confess that I myself fall into this camp: I
remain relatively agnostic on the War on Terror, but I do feel
strongly that Congress should not commandeer state and local
officers. I suspect that decision makers and observers who fit
this particular description do tend to care somewhat whether
structural arguments directed to them seem overly
opportunistic; they may wonder, for example, whether the
advocate of a particular policy would be willing to accept a
similar argument for state autonomy on a question where he
might not like the policy outcome. There is, in other words, a
measure of credibility to be gained by attempting to be at least
somewhat principled on structural questions.
A second caveat has to do with the long-term
implications of structural safeguards. The point of those
safeguards, as I discussed in Part I, is to preserve space for the
freedom to disagree by dividing power and governing
competence. By arguing for state and local autonomy, then,
political partisans not only may serve their short-term
interests; they also hedge their bets against defeat on a whole
range of issues at the national level. In this sense, state and
local autonomy may be in the long-term interests of any group
that is not sure of victory at the national level for its entire
political program.
The upshot of these musings is twofold: First, observers
of political debate should be a little less quick to cry "hypocrisy"
when political liberals embrace state autonomy, or when
political conservatives opt for national power. That is simply
the natural political dynamic that the Framers anticipated.
But second, political partisans should - for the sake of their
own credibility - be cautious about too much opportunism in
these matters. By taking a little longer-term perspective on the
need for balance in the federal system, moreover, they may
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preserve the necessary institutional space for future
disagreement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The War on Terror has made for strange bedfellows in
any number of respects. Libertarians on the far Right have
joined with civil liberties advocates on the Left to oppose the
expansion of law enforcement powers. The Labour Prime
Minister of Great Britain has tied his political fortunes
inextricably to the most conservative Republican President in
many, many years. And liberals have come to embrace "states'
rights" - even if they often cannot bear to use the term - as a
mechanism for fostering political resistance to the PATRIOT
Act. Welcome to the Dark Side, indeed.
My primary point in this essay has been to suggest that
this is as it should be. Federalism is about dividing power;
nothing much depends on what the power in question is being
used for. It is also about providing institutional space for a
diversity of political views. As such, it should surprise no one
that a commitment to state and local autonomy would take on
the hue of political opposition to the prevailing orthodoxy at the
center, whatever that orthodoxy happens to be. Relatively few
people are likely to embrace federalism for its own sake - that
may, in fact, be primarily the office of law professors, who are
well-known to suffer from a somewhat tenuous connection to
political reality. Rather, support for state autonomy vis A vis
national power on both Left and Right has ebbed and flowed
throughout our history, according to the dynamics of whatever
political issue is most salient at any given time.
This observation does, of course, have a somewhat
melancholy implication for those of us who do care more about
structural issues than day-to-day politics. In suggesting that
liberals are right to embrace federalism in the context of the
War on Terror, we have not uncovered any fundamental new
truth about state autonomy; there is no reason, in other words,
to assume that liberals will - or should - take the States' side
in whatever the next big political debate turns out to be.
Partisans of state autonomy can nonetheless welcome these
new allies while they last, even if we cannot be confident they
will stay around for long.
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